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Abstract
We consider the theoretical properties of a model which encompasses
bi-partite matching under transferable utility on the one hand, and hedo-
nic pricing on the other. This framework is intimately connected to tri-
partite matching problems (known as multi-marginal optimal transport
problems in the mathematical literature). We exploit this relationship
in two ways; first, we show that a known structural result from multi-
marginal optimal transport can be used to establish an upper bound on
the dimension of the support of stable matchings. Next, assuming the
distribution of agents on one side of the market is continuous, we iden-
tify a condition on their preferences that ensures purity and uniqueness
of the stable matching; this condition is a variant of a known condition in
the mathematical literature, which guarantees analogous properties in the
multi-marginal optimal transport problem. We exhibit several examples
of surplus functions for which our condition is satisfied, as well as some
for which it fails.
1 Introduction
This paper considers the theoretical properties of a general model, which encom-
passes both the transferable utility matching model of Shapley and Shubik [25]
and Becker [1], extended to continuous type spaces by Gretsky, Ostroy and
Zame [12], and the hedonic model of Rosen [22], whose theoretical properties
(in a continuous, multi-dimensional setting) were studied by Ekeland [7, 8] and
Chiappori-McCann-Nesheim [5].
In the hedonic model, agents on two sides of a market (eg, buyers and sellers)
are matched together according to their preferences to exchange certain goods,
assuming they are indifferent to which partner they do business with. Letting
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number 412779-2012.
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X and Y be spaces of buyers and sellers, respectively, and Z the set of goods
that can feasibly be produced, we assume that agents’ preferences are encoded
respectively by functions u(x, z) and v(y, z), expressing the utilities of buyer
x ∈ X and seller y ∈ Y if they purchase or produce a product of type z ∈ Z,
respectively. The main problem is then to determine which buyers match with
which sellers, which goods they exchange and the prices they exchange for them,
in equilibirum.
In the matching model, agent x (respectively y) has a preference u(x, y)
(respectively v(x, y)) to match with agent y (respectively x). Together, a match
between x and y generates a joint utility, or surplus, s(x, y) = u(x, y) + v(x, y).
Utility can then be transferred in the form of a payment from one agent to the
other; by this mechanism, the total surplus s(x, y) can be divided in any way
between the two agents. Here the good z to be exchanged (or the non monetary
terms of the contract) does not affect agents’ preferences.
Recently, Dupuy, Galichon and Zhao [6] formulated a hybrid model in which
agents have preferences which depend on both their partners and the product
under exchange. In that paper, x and y represent agents on different sides of a
marriage market, and z the location where they would agree to settle; however,
as was noted by the authors, the model has much wider potential applicabil-
ity. In family economics, for instance, when a couple match together, there
are many conditions of the match which can affect the surplus generated. In
addition to location, a couple may choose to marry or to live together without
marrying, and to have one or more children, for example. These decisions affect
the surplus differently depending on the couple; see, for example, [17]. When
considering buyers and sellers, it also seems natural in many scenarios to allow
consumers’ preferences to depend on both the producer he does business with
and the good he receives. For example, consumers often exhibit brand loyalty;
they may be willing to pay more (for the same good) when dealing with one
company rather than another. On the other hand, producers’ preferences can
also depend on the consumers they sell to; for example, mortgage lenders of-
ten offer better rates to clients with higher credit scores, reflecting the fact that
they prefer to do business with more credit worthy borrowers. Another example
occurs in insurance models like the one of Rothschild and Stiglitz [23]; insur-
ance companies offer the same policy at different prices to different consumers
depending on how their characteristics influence the risk of a claim.
The theortical properties of these hybrid models do not seem to have received
much attention. In this paper, we study this model when the type spaces X and
Y and the space of feasible contracts Z are all continuous. In both the classical
matching problem, and the hedonic problem, conditions are well known which
ensure that the equilibrium, or stable matching, is unique and pure. In the
matching problem, this condition is known as the twist, or generalized Spence-
Mirrlees condition. One natural question in the present setting is to identify
conditions on the joint surplus function (which is now a function of x, y and z,
without any specific form) in the more general model which ensure purity and
uniqueness of the stable match.
Both the strict matching and hedonic problems have well established connec-
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tions to a variational problem known as optimal transportation; economically,
this is exactly the social planner’s problem of matching the agents in order to
maximize their average surplus (a detailed introduction to this subject can be
found in Galichon [9], Santambrogio [24] and Villani [28]). The generalized
model studied here turns out to have natural connections to both the classi-
cal optimal transport problem, and variant of it where there are three (rather
than two) measures to be matched (known in the mathematics literature as a
multi-marginal optimal transport problem). Our main contribution here is to
establish and exploit these connections to uncover insights into matching pat-
terns for this generalized matching-hedonic model. As an immediate application
of the multi-marginal optimal transport point of view, we establish an upper
bound on the dimension of the support of stable matchings (which are measures
on the product space X × Y × Z) in terms of the signature of the off-diagonal
part of the Hessian of s. We then find conditions on the functions u and v, and
the measures µ and ν ensuring existence, uniqueness and purity of equilibria.
Our condition here is a weaker variant of the twist on splitting sets condition,
which is known to ensure purity and uniqueness in the multi-marginal optimal
transport problem; we will call the condition for the hybrid matching problem
the twist on z-trivial splitting sets.
In addition, due to recent work of Chiappori, McCann and Nesheim [5],
it is now clear that the hedonic problem is actually equivalent to a matching
problem, with a surplus equal to the the maximum possible joint utility for
buyers and sellers, among all possible goods; we often refer to the analogous
maximized surplus s¯(x, y) (see (6)) in our setting as the reduced surplus, as
we have reduced the number of variables from three to two (that is, s¯ depends
only on x and y). This equivalence persists in our setting. In this simplified
but equivalent bipartite matching setting, the twist condition on the maximal
surplus (6) ensures the uniqueness and purity of the stable match. It is desirable
then, to understand when the twist condition on the surplus (6) holds; we show
that, under certain conditions, this is essentially equivalent to our twist on z-
trivial splitting sets condition on s. We believe that this equivalence indicates
that twist on z-trivial splitting sets is a natural condition for the hybrid problem.
In the next section, we outline the model under consideration and establish
some of its basic properties. In the third section, we use the connection with
multi-marginal optimal transport to establish a result on the local structure (ie,
the dimension of the support) of stable matchings. In section four we develop our
sufficient condition for purity and uniqueness of stable matchings, while section
five is devoted to the reformulation of our problem as a strict matching problem
(with a reduced surplus function) and the demonstration that the classical twist
condition of s¯ is equivalent to our twist on z-trivial splitting sets condition on
the surplus s. The sixth section presents some examples, while we offer a brief
conclusion in the final section.
Short, simple proofs of mathematical results are included within the body
of the paper; longer or more involved mathematical arguments are relegated to
an appendix, to avoid interupting the flow of the paper.
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2 The general model and basic properties
We consider heterogeneous distributions of buyer and seller types, encoded re-
spectively by compactly supported Borel probability measures µ on X ⊆ Rnx
and ν on Y ⊆ Rny , and a set of feasible goods, parameterized by Z ⊆ Rnz .
Tthe sets X , Y and Z will be the closures of open and bounded sets X0, Y 0
and Z0, respectively, with smooth boundaries. Each buyer will buy exactly one
good; each seller will produce and sell exactly one good.1
The preference of a buyer of type x to purchase a good of type z from a seller
of type y will be given by a function u(x, y, z), while the preference of a seller
of type y to sell a good of type z to a buyer of type x is given by v(x, y, z). We
will assume throughout the paper that u and v are uniformly Lipschitz; stonger
regularity hypotheses will be adopted at various specific points. Utilities will be
quasilinear, so that the utility derived by a buyer purchasing a good of type z
from a seller of type y for a price p will be
u(x, y, z)− p
and similarly, the utility derived by a seller selling a good of type z to a buyer
of type x for a price p will be
v(x, y, z) + p.
We will denote by s(x, y, z) the total, or joint, surplus generated when a buyer
of type x purchases a good of type z from a seller of type y:
s(x, y, z) = u(x, y, z) + v(x, y, z).
As the utility can freely be transferred from one partner to another, the
analytical properties of s, rather than u and v separately, are most relevant in
determining the purity and uniqueness of equilibrium.
We define a matching as a probability measure γ on X × Y × Z whose first
marginal is µ and whose second marginal is ν; that is
γ(A× Y × Z) = µ(A), γ(X ×B × Z) = ν(B)
for all Borel A ⊆ X , B ⊆ Y . This represents an assignment of the agents in the
sets X and Y into pairs, and assigns to each pair a good from the set Z to be
exchanged. We will denote by ΓXY Z(µ, ν) the set of all matchings of µ and ν
on X × Y × Z.
We will say that a mapping T : X → Y pushes µ forward to ν, and write
ν = T#µ if µ(T
−1(B)) = ν(B) for all Borel B ⊆ Y .
For a given measure γ on X × Y × Z, we denote by γXY its projection
onto X × Y , a measure on X × Y defined by γXY (C) = γ(C × Z) for any
1It would be straightforward to enhance the model to allow for unequal numbers of buyers
and sellers, and to allow both to decline to participate in any match; this can be done as in [5],
by augmenting the measures µ and ν with Dirac masses, representing null buyers and sellers.
As this is tangential to our main purpose here, we work instead with the simpler model in
which all agents participate.
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C ⊂ X × Y . The measures γXZ and γY Z are defined analogously. Note that
γXY = (PXY )#γ, where PXY : X × Y × Z → X × Y is the projection map,
PXY (x, y, z) := (x, y). It is also worth noting that if γ is a matching of µ and
ν, then γXY has marginals µ and ν.
Given a matching γ, functions U(x) and V (y) are called payoff functions for
γ if
U(x) + V (y) = s(x, y, z)
for γ almost every (x, y, z). For any matching, points in the support2 spt(γ) of
γ (and hence in the equality set {U(x)+V (y) = u(x, y, z)+v(x, y, z)} for payoff
functions U and V ) represent buyer-seller pairs who are matched together by γ,
together with the good they exchange. Payoff functions then represent a division
of the surplus between matched pairs. Given such a triple (x, y, z) ∈ spt(γ) and
payoffs U(x) and V (y), the price3 that y charges x in exchange for the good z
is given
px,y,z := u(x, y, z)− U(x) = V (y)− v(x, y, z). (1)
The matching is called stable if there exist payoff functions U(x) and V (y)
such that
U(x) + V (y) ≥ u(x, y, z) + v(x, y, z) (2)
for all (x, y, z).
The condition (2) ensures stability of the matching in the sense that no
pair of unmatched agents would both prefer to leave their current partners and
match together. If (2) failed, so that U(x) + V (y) < u(x, y, z) + v(x, y, z) for
some unmatched buyer-seller-good triple (x, y, z) (that is, (x, y, z) /∈ spt(γ)),
then buyer x and seller y would be incentivized to exchange good z for a price
p such that
V (y)− v(x, y, z) < p < u(x, y, z)− U(x),
resulting in increased payoffs U¯(x) := u(x, y, z) − p > U(x) and V¯ (y) :=
v(x, y, z) + p > V (y) for both x and y.
Finally, we turn our attention to purity of matchings. There are several
relevant notions of purity here, corresponding to various relationships between
buyers, sellers, and goods.
Definition 2.1. A matching γ is called buyer-seller pure if its projection γXY
onto X×Y is concentrated on a graph over X; that is, if there exists a function
FY : X → Y such that γXY = (Id, FY )#µ. We say γ is buyer-good pure if its
projection γXZ onto X × Z is concentrated on a graph over X; that is, if there
exists a function FZ : X → Z such that γXZ = (Id, FZ )#µ.
We will call γ buyer-(seller, good) pure (or simply pure) if it is both buyer-
seller and buyer-good pure, which means that γ is concentrated on a graph over
2The support of γ is the smallest closed set spt(γ) ⊂ X×Y×Z with full mass, γ(spt(γ)) = 1.
3In contrast to the strict hedonic problem, one cannot hope for a market clearing pricing
function p(z) which is independent of x and y here; it is possible that the same good may be
exchanged between different pairs of buyers and seller for different prices.
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X. In other words, there exist functions FY : X → Y and FZ : X → Z such
that γ = (Id, FY , FZ)#µ.
Note that one could analogously define several other notions of purity (seller-
buyer, good-seller, etc). The economic interpretation of, for instance, buyer-
seller purity is that there is no randomness in each buyer x’s choices of the
seller y = FY (x) he works with; buyers of the same type will (almost) always
buy goods from sellers of the same type.
One of our main contributions in this paper is to identify a condition on the
surplus that ensures full, buyer-(seller, good) purity; as we will see, the same
condition will guarantee uniqueness of the stable matching as well.
2.1 Variational interpretation
Much like the classical matching and hedonic problems, the problem of finding
stable matchings in our setting has a variational formulation. Consider the
problem of maximizing ∫
X×Y×Z
s(x, y, z)dγ(x, y, z) (3)
over the set ΓXY Z(µ, ν) of all matchings of µ and ν (that is, maximizing the
total surplus of all agents).
Theorem 2.2. A matching γ is an equilibrium if and only if it is optimal in
(3).
This result is well known in the classical matching case in [12], when the
surplus s (and hence the matching measures γ as well) depends only on x and
y. For general hybrid surplus functions, s(x, y, z), the result is proven in the
discrete case in [6]. The proof here requires no new ideas, but is included in an
appendix in the interest of completeness.
By standard arguments, Theorem 2.2 implies existence of a stable matching.
Corollary 2.3. There exists at least one stable matching γ.
Proof. The proof is by continuity and compactness, and is completely standard.
Continuity of s immediately implies continuity of
γ 7→
∫
X×Y×Z
s(x, y, z)dγ(x, y, z)
with respect to weak convergence of measures. The Riesz-Markov theorem
identifies the dual of the set C(X×Y ×Z) of continuous functions on X×Y ×Z
with the set M(X × Y × Z) of regular Borel measures on X × Y × Z, with
norm given by total variation (which is total mass, for positive measures). The
Banach-Alaoglu theorem then asserts that the closed unit ball inM(X×Y ×Z)
is compact. The set ΓXY Z(µ, ν) is clearly a weakly closed subset of this unit
ball, and therefore is itself compact. The existence of a maximizer of (3) over
the set ΓXY Z(µ, ν), and hence a stable matching by Theorem 2.2, then follows
immediately.
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2.2 Connection to tripartite matching
Problem (3) is closely related to a tripartite matching problem (also known, in
the mathematical literature, as the multi-marginal optimal transport problem),
where in addition to prescribing the distributions of agents µ on X , ν on Y , one
fixes the distribution α on Z 4. Finding a stable matching in this problem is
equivalent to the following maximization:
T (µ, ν, α) := max
γ∈ΓXY Z(µ,ν,α)
∫
X×Y×Z
s(x, y, z)dγ(x, y, z) (4)
where the maximum is over the set ΓXY Z(µ, ν, α) of positive measures on X ×
Y × Z whose marginals are µ, ν and α. The underlying relationship between
tripartite matching and our present problem is that the variational problem (3)
(and therefore the equivalent hybrid matching-hedonic problem) is equivalent
to maximizing T (µ, ν, α) over the set of all probability measures α on Z.
There is a growing mathematical and economic literature on tripartite (or,
more generally, multipartite) matching, which will be useful in what follows, as
some of the results there can be translated to the present setting. In particular,
an immediate application is an upper bound on the dimension on the support
of the stable matching, which is presented in the next section. In addition,
conditions ensuring purity and uniqueness in (4) have been identified in [13]. In
a subsequent section, we use this as a guide to develop a similar condition for
problem (3); our condition here is somewhat weaker than the one in [13], as we
do not require purity in (4) for every choice of α; we require it only for those
which maximize α 7→ T (µ, ν, α).
3 Dimension of the support of matching mea-
sures
Even when the conditions for purity and uniqueness developed in the next sec-
tion fail, there are results known about the local structure of the optimizer in
(4); as any stable matching γ maximizes (4), taking α to be its z marginal, these
results immediately apply to stable matchings as well.
More specifically, for a C2 surplus function, the theorem below provides a
bound on the Hausdorff dimension of the support of γ in terms of the off diagonal
part of the Hessian of s. Consider the symmetric (nx+ny+nz)× (nx+ny+nz)
matrix
G :=

 0 D
2
xys D
2
xzs
D2yxs 0 D
2
yzs
D2zxs D
2
zys 0


4In these tri-partitie matching problems, the variables are typically interpreted differently;
economically, they model problems where three agents are required to form a match (think,
for example, of firms hiring simultaneously both CEOS and CFOS, drawn from separate
distributions). The distributions of all three types of agents (firms, CEOs and CFOs) are
then known, and finding a stable match is equivalent to maximizing (4) (see Carlier and
Ekeland [4]).
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where the three diagonal 0 blocks are nx × nx, ny × ny and nz × nz, respec-
tively, D2xys :=
(
∂2s
∂xi∂yj
)
ij
is the nx × ny matrix of mixed second order partial
derivatives with respect to the components of x and y, and the other non-zero
blocks are defined similarly.
Recall that the signature (λ+, λ−, λ0) of a symmetric N × N matrix is an
ordered triple representing the numbers λ+, λ− and λ0 = N−λ+−λ− of positive,
negative and zero eigenvalues, respectively.
Theorem 3.1. Assume that s ∈ C2(X × Y × Z) and that at some point
(x0, y0.z0) ∈ X × Y × Z, the signature of G is (λ+, λ−, nx + ny + nz − λ+ −
λ−). Then there is a neighbourhood U of (x0, y0, z0) in X × Y × Z such that
spt(γ) ∩ U is contained in a Lipschitz submanifold of X × Y × Z of dimension
nx + ny + nz − λ−.
The same result is proven for optimizers of (4) in [18, 19], and that result
immediately implies this one. Note that the dimension nx + ny + nz − λ− is
the number of non-negative eigenvalues of G; in fact, if spt(γ) is a differen-
tiable manifold at (x0, y0, z0), then v
TGv ≥ 0 for any v in the tangent space of
spt(γ) [18, 19]. It is worth noting that, unlike the purity results in the subse-
quent section, this theorem does not require any regularity assumptions on the
marginals µ and ν.
The following proposition, also established in [18], asserts that when the
dimensions are all equal, the signature can be determined from the symmetric
part of the product D2zys[D
2
xys]
−1D2xzs.
Proposition 3.2. If nx = ny = nz =: n, and the matrices D
2
xys,D
2
xzs and
D2yzs are all invertible, then the signature of G is given by (λ+, λ−, λ0) = (n+
r−, n + r+, n − r− − r+) where r+ (respectively r−) is the number of positive
(respectively negative) eigenvalues of the n× n symmetric matrix
D2zys[D
2
xys]
−1D2xzs+D
2
zxs[D
2
yxs]
−1D2yzs.
In particular, if nx = ny = nz = 1 and
∂2s
∂z∂y [
∂2s
∂x∂y ]
−1 ∂2s
∂x∂z > 0, then
(r+, r−) = (1, 0) in the proposition above and so the proposition together with
Theorem 3.1 assert that any stable matching is concentrated on a 1-dimensional
Lipschitz submanifold; that is, a curve. We will see later on that for an abso-
lutely continuous µ, the same condition ensures purity and uniqueness.
In higher (but still equal) dimensions, the situation is more subtle. For a
bilinear surplus function s(x, y, z) = xTAy+xTBz+yTCz+f(x)+g(y)+h(z),
as in Example 6.2 below, the condition
D2zys[D
2
xys]
−1D2xzs+D
2
zxs[D
2
yxs]
−1D2yzs = C
TA−1B +BT (AT )−1C > 0,
together with absolute continuity of µ implies purity (see Example 6.2), but
for more general forms of s, one can have solutions which concentrate on n
dimensional sets but are not pure. Consider, for example, the surplus on R2 ×
R
2 × R2 from [16]
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s(x, y, z) = ex
1+y1 cos(x2−y2)+ex
1+z1 cos(x2−z2)+ey
1+z1 cos(z2−y2)−e2x
1
−e2y
1
−e2z
1
.
For this surplus, a straightforward calculation, found in [16], verifies that the
product D2zys[D
2
xys]
−1D2xzs+D
2
zxs[D
2
yxs]
−1D2yzs is a scalar multiple of the iden-
tity, and the results above then imply that the signature of G is (2, 4, 0). Every
stable matching for this surplus therefore concentrates on sets of no more than
2 dimensions.
However, stable matchings may not be pure. It is straightforward to check
that s(x, y, z) ≤ 0 for all (x, y, z), with equality on the set
(x, y, z) ∈ S = {(x, y, z) : x1 = y1 = z1 and x2−y2 = 2hpi, x2−z2 = 2lpi for some integers h, l}.
It follows that any γ concentrated on S is stable (we can take U = V = 0 as the
payoff functions).. This set is two dimensional, as predicted by the calculations
above, but not concentrated on a graph, and so the matching is not pure.
4 Conditions for purity and uniqueness
We now turn our attention to the purity and uniqueness of stable matchings.
For the sake of comparison, we first recall known purity and uniqueness results
for the simpler, strict matching and hedonic problems. The twist, or generalized
Spence-Mirrlees, condition plays a fundamental role in that setting:
Definition 4.1. Given a differentiable function, say s(x, y), of two variables,
we say u is x− y twisted if for each x ∈ X, the mapping
y 7→ Dxs(x, y)
is injective. Here, Dx represents the gradient of s with respect to the x variable.
We will use the same terminology for functions of several variables, when
all but one are held fixed. That is, we say s(x, y, z) is x− z twisted if for each
x ∈ X, y ∈ Y , the mapping
z 7→ Dxs(x, y, z)
is injective.
4.1 Classical matching and hedonic problems
We first review a purity result in the straight matching case, s = s(x, y).
Theorem 4.2. (Matching problems) Assume that u = u(x, y) and v =
v(x, y) depend only on x and y. Assume that µ is absolutely continuous with
respect to Lebesgue measure and s(x, y) = u(x, y)+v(x, y) is x−y twisted. Then
any stable matching is buyer-seller pure and its projection γXY onto X × Y is
uniquely determined; that is, if γ and γ¯ are stable matchings, γXY = γ¯XY .
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This result is well known; a proof can be found in [5]. Indeed, in the math-
ematics literature, comparable results regarding the equivalent optimal trans-
port problem were established, in various levels of generality, by Brenier [2],
Gangbo [10], Levin [14], Gangbo-McCann [11] Caffarelli [3].
Note that in our terminology, stable matchings are measures on X × Y ×
Z, whereas in the literature the strict matching problem is usually formulated
instead in terms of measures on X×Y , as the good z plays no role in the surplus
function. In our formulation, we would not have full uniqueness; any measure
on X × Y × Z, whose projection onto X × Y is γXY is a stable matching, as
both agents x and y are indifferent to the superfluous good z.
We now turn to the fully hedonic case, where agents’ preferences u = u(x, z)
and v = v(y, z) depend on goods but not on their partners.
Theorem 4.3. (Hedonic problems) Assume that agents’ preferences u =
u(x, z) and v = v(y, z) depend only on (x, z) and (y, z), respectively, and that µ
is absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure. Then:
1. If u is x − z twisted, the stable matching is buyer-good pure and it’s pro-
jection γXZ onto X × Z is uniquely determined.
2. If in addition, v is z − y twisted, and, for each fixed x, y, every maximum
of the mapping z 7→ u(x, z) + v(y, z) over Z occurs on the interior of Z,
the stable matching measure is buyer-(seller,good) pure and unique.
The proof of part 1 can be found in [7], while the proof of the second assertion
requires a minor additional argument.
Proof. (of assertion 2)
Using part 1), we have the existence of a unique map FZ : X → Z such that,
for γ almost every (x, y, z), z = FZ(x). Now, by a result in [5], we also have for
γ almost every (x, y, z) that z maximizes z′ 7→ u(x, z′) + v(y, z′), so that
Dzu(x, z) = −Dzv(y, z)
or
Dzu(x, FZ(x)) = −Dzv(y, FZ(x)). (5)
The z − y twist condition then ensures that there is only one y satisfying this
equation. That is, y =: FY (x) is uniquely determined by x ; ie, the matching is
pure. Therefore, the stable matching γ takes the form γ = (Id, FY , FZ)#µ, and
as FZ is unique by part 1, and FY is uniquely determined from (5) by FZ , γ is
unique.
4.2 Fully mixed problems
Our condition for purity and uniqueness will require a couple of definitions. The
first is borrowed from [13].
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Definition 4.4. (Splitting sets) For a fixed x ∈ X, a set Sx ⊂ Y × Z is a
splitting set at x if there exist functions V (y) and W (z) such that
s(x, y, z) ≤ V (y) +W (z)
with equality whenever (y, z) ∈ Sx.
The particular case when W (z) = 0 in the above definition is especially
relevant for this paper:
Definition 4.5. (z-trivial splitting sets) For a fixed x ∈ X, a set Sx ⊂ Y ×Z
is a z-trivial splitting set at x if there exists a function V (y) such that
s(x, y, z) ≤ V (y)
with equality whenever (y, z) ∈ Sx.
It is clear that any z-trivial splitting set is a splitting set. The role of z-trivial
splitting sets in the matching problem (3) is fairly transparent; for a given buyer
x, the collection of all seller-contract pairs (y, z) achieving equality in (2) (and
hence potentially matching with x in equilibrium) is a z-trivial splitting set at
x. As was observed in [13], splitting sets play a similar role in the tripartite
matching problem (4).
Remark 4.6. It is worth noting that Sx is a z-trivial splitting set at x if and
only if z¯ maximizes z 7→ s(x, y¯, z) for each (y¯, z¯) ∈ Sx.
Definition 4.7. (Twist on splitting sets) A differentiable surplus s(x, y, z)
is twisted on splitting sets (or (TSS) for short), if whenever Sx ⊆ Y × Z is a
splitting set at x and p ∈ Rnx , there is at most one (y, z) ∈ Sx such that
p = Dxs(x, y, z).
In [13], the (TSS) condition was shown to imply purity in the multi-agent
matching model (4). Here, we introduce a variant, replacing splitting sets with
z-trivial splitting sets, which will play an analagous role in (3) and the related
matching problem.
Definition 4.8. (Twist on z-trivial splitting sets) A differentiable surplus
s(x, y, z) is twisted on z-trivial splitting sets (or (TzSS) for short), if whenever
Sx ⊆ Y × Z is a z-trivial splitting set at x and p ∈ R
nx , there is at most one
(y, z) ∈ Sx such that
p = Dxs(x, y, z).
We are now ready to state our main theoretical result on the purity of
matchings.
Theorem 4.9. Suppose s is twisted on z-trival splitting sets, and µ is absolutely
continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure. Then any stable matching γ is
pure.
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The proof of this result is fairly standard; it involves applying the envelope
theorem with respect to x on the equality set in (2) to equate the gradients of
U and s (with respect to x), and then using the (TzSS) condition to infer the
resulting equation can have only one solution. There is one technical difficulty,
which is also standard in problems of this type; the payoff function U(x) may
not be differentiable. We use a (well known) convexification trick to get around
this, replacing U with a Lipschitz (and hence differentiable almost everywhere,
by Rademacher’s theorem) payoff function, U¯ . The proof can be found in the
appendix.
A standard argument now implies uniqueness of the stable matching.
Corollary 4.10. Under the conditions in the preceding Theorem, the stable
matching is unique.
Proof. Suppose γ and γ¯ are stable matchings; by Theorem 4.9, we know that
both γ and γ¯ are pure, γ = (Id, F )#µ and γ¯ = (Id, F¯ )#µ for F, F¯ : X 7→ Y ×Z,
and, by Theorem 2.2, both are also maximizers of (3). It is then easy to see
that γ1/2 :=
1
2 [γ + γ¯] ∈ ΓXY Z(µ, ν). It is therefore also optimal in (3), as the
functional is linear. By Theorem 4.9 again, γ1/2 too must then be supported on
the graph of some function; on the other hand, it is clear that it is supported
on the union of the graphs of F and F¯ , which then implies that F (x) = F¯ (x)
almost everywhere, and so γ = γ¯, yielding uniqueness.
As any z-trivial splitting set is a splitting set (one needs only to takeW (z) =
0 in the definition), any surplus which is twisted on splitting sets is twisted on
z-trivial splitting sets. Therefore, we also have the following Corollary:
Corollary 4.11. Suppose s is twisted on splitting sets, and µ is absolutely
continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure. Then the stable matching γ is
unique and pure.
The preceding Corollary is potentially useful, as several examples of surplus
functions satisfying the twist on splitting sets condition are known, as well as
general sufficient differential conditions ensuring it [13] [21]. Some of these will
be discussed in Section 6 below.
5 Reformulation as a bipartite matching prob-
lem
Here we provide a different, but equivalent, formulation of the problem, following
Chiappori, McCann and Nesheim [5], as a binary matching, or two marginal
optimal transport, problem. We define the reduced surplus by:
s¯(x, y) = max
z∈Z
[u(x, y, z) + v(x, y, z)]. (6)
The meaning of s¯(x, y) is clear; it expresses the maximum joint surplus
(among all possible contracts) that can be generated by the partnership of x
and y. The classical two marginal optimal transport problem is to maximize
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∫
X×Y
s¯(x, y)dσ(x, y) (7)
over the set ΓXY (µ, ν) of probability measures on X × Y with X (respectively
Y ) marginal µ (respectively ν). This optimization problem is equivalent to the
classical strict stable matching problem under transferable utility, with surplus
s¯ [12] [5].
For each x, y, choose z¯(x, y) ∈ argmaxz[u(x, y, z) + v(x, y, z)]; note that z¯
then defines a function z¯ : X × Y → Z. Due to compactness, one can choose
this selection to be Borel measurable.
Proposition 5.1. Suppose a measure σ is optimal in (7). Then (Id, Id, z¯)#σ
is optimal for (3). Conversely, if γ is optimal in (3), then γXY = (PXY )#γ is
optimal in (7), where PXY (x, y, z) = (x, y).
The proof of this result is almost identical to the proof of the analagous
result in [5] and can be found in the appendix.
As the well known Spence-Mirlees condition on s¯ is known to imply purity
and uniqueness of maximizers in (7), it is natural to look for conditions on s
which ensure it. We show that the twist on z-trivial sets for s is equivalent to the
classical generalized Spence-Mirrlees condition on s¯ (under an extra condition
on s). Note that this, combined with the preceding proposition and Theorem
4.2 yields an alternative proof of the buyer-seller aspects of the purity and
uniqueness results in the last section (that is, buyer-seller purity and uniqueness
of γXY ).
Theorem 5.2. Assume that both s and s¯ are everywhere differentiable with
respect to x. If s satisfies the twist on z-trivial splitting sets condition, then s¯
satisfies the twist condition.
Conversely, assume that s is x − z twisted. Then, if s¯ satisfies the twist
condition, s satisfies the twist on z-trivial splitting sets condition.
The proof is relegated to an appendix.
Remark 5.3. From inspection of the proof, it is clear that in fact slightly more
is true.
If we assume that s¯ is twisted, but remove the x− z twist assumption on s,
the argument in the proof of the second implication still yields that if (y0, z0) and
(y1, z1) are in any splitting set Sx at x, and Dxs(x, y0, z0) = Dxs(x, y1, z1) then
y0 = y1 (although possibly z0 6= z1). This then implies that any stable matching
is buyer-seller pure, and that its projection onto X × Y is uniquely determined
(as can also be proven using the twistedness of s¯ in combination with Theorem
4.2).
Remark 5.4. If s is either Lipschitz or semi-convex, one can show by a stan-
dard argument that s¯ is also Lipschitz or semi-convex, respectively, and it is well
known that functions satisfying either one of these criteria are differentiable al-
most everywhere. In fact, a version of the twist condition implying purity and
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uniqueness can be formulated under either of these assumptions (in place of ev-
erywhere differentiability) [5], and our proof in the appendix adapts easily to
this setting. It follows that one can remove the assumption of differentiability
on s¯ in the preceding theorem; we present the version with the differentiability
assumption on s¯ here for simplicity.
6 Examples
While the twist on z-trivial splitting sets condition looks complicated, it is
possible to verify it on several classes of examples. We present here three types
of examples:
1. Examples satisfying the more restrictive twist on splitting sets condition
(and hence the twist on z-trivial splitting sets condition introduced here
as well). A wide variety of examples of this type are already known in the
mathematical literature.
2. Examples violating the twist on splitting sets condition, but satisfying
twist on z-trivial splitting sets.
3. An example violating twist on z-trivial splitting sets, together with an
explicit non-pure stable matching.
6.1 Surpluses satisfying twist on splitting sets
As mentioned above, a variety of examples satisfying the twist on splitting sets
condition (and therefore also the twist on z-trivial splitting sets condition), as
well as general differential conditions on s which imply them, are known [13].
As the differential conditions are somewhat complicated, we do not state them
here; instead, we present a couple of examples which seem potentially relevant
in economics
Example 6.1. (One dimensional problems)
Suppose X,Y, Z ⊂ R are all real intervals. Then s is twisted on splitting
sets provided the compatibility condition, ∂
2s
∂x∂y [
∂2s
∂z∂y ]
−1 ∂2s
∂z∂x > 0, holds for all
(x, y, z) ∈ X × Y × Z. In particular, this holds when s is supermodular in each
pair of its arguments.
The next example is similar to the Tinbergen model [26], augmented to
include direct buyer-seller interactions.
Example 6.2. (Bilinear utilities)
Suppose X,Y, Z ⊂ Rn are convex and
s(x, y, z) = xTAy + xTBz + yTCz + f(x) + g(y) + h(z)
for nonsingular n× n matrices A,B and C. Then s is twisted on splitting sets
provided the symmetric matrix CTA−1B +BT (AT )−1C is positive definite.
14
Note that the positive definiteness assumption on CTA−1B + BT (AT )−1C
forces each of the matrices A,B and C to be invertible. Proofs of the (TSS)
property for the surplus functions in both of the examples in this subsection can
be found in [13].
Remark 6.3. As we will see below, the sufficient conditions for purity and
uniqueness considered here (twist on splitting sets) are substantially stronger
than the twist on z-trivial splitting sets, and so, when studying purity and
uniqueness in the hybrid matching-hedonic model, the motivation for consid-
ering the multi-marginal coupling between buyers, sellers and (prescribed) goods
and the related twist on splitting sets condition may seem questionable. How-
ever, there are at least two concrete advantages to doing so.
First, the twist on splitting sets condition is often easier to check. For in-
stance, in one dimension, the compatibility condition in Example 6.1 is essen-
tially equivalent to twist on splitting sets and hence is an easy to check sufficient
condition for twist on z-trivial splitting sets; if compatibility fails, twist on z-
trivial splitting sets may still hold, but establishing this typically requires more
delicate arguments.
Secondly, the twist on splitting sets condition has some flexibility not shared
by the twist on z-trivial splitting sets; namely, if s(x, y, z) is twisted on splitting
sets, then so is s(x, y, z)+F (z) for any function z. This fact may make it easier
to check on certain examples.
6.2 Surplus satisfying the twist on z-trivial splitting sets
(but violating twist on splitting sets)
The (TzSS) condition is strictly weaker than the (TSS) condition. We demon-
strate this here by presenting two examples which do not satisfy the twist on
splitting sets condition, but do satisfy the weaker variant, twist on z-trivial
splitting sets.
Example 6.4. (Strictly hedonic utilities) Assume that the utilities of both
consumers and producers depend only on goods, u(x, y, z) = u(x, z) and v(x, y, z) =
v(y, z), and that for each fixed x and y, all maxima of the function z 7→
u(x, z)+v(y, z) occur on the interior of Z. Then x−z twistedness on u and z−y
twistedness on v suffice to ensure the twist on z-trivial splitting sets condition
on s(x, y, z) = u(x, z) + v(y, z).
The proof of this assertion can be found in the appendix.
Remark 6.5. The conditions in Example 6.4 do not imply the twist on splitting
sets condition, and as a result it is possible for the solution to the tripartite
matching problem (4) with surplus s(x, y, z) = u(x, z)+v(y, z) to be non-unique
and non-pure. Suppose, for example, α = δz0 is concentrated at a point. Then
if a probability measure γ on X × Y ×Z is in ΓXY Z(µ, ν, α) (ie, has marginals
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µ, ν and α) we have z = z0, γ almost surely, so that∫
X×Y×Z
s(x, y, z)dγ(x, y, z) =
∫
X×Y×Z
[u(x, z) + v(y, z)]dγ(x, y, z)
=
∫
X×Y×Z
[u(x, z0) + v(y, z0)]dγ(x, y, z)
=
∫
X
u(x, z0)dµ(x) +
∫
Y
v(y, z0)dν(y).
As the last expression does not depend on γ, any γ ∈ ΓXY Z(µ, ν, α) maximizes
the total surplus and is therefore stable.
We close this subsection by revisiting the Tinbergen [26] type surplus func-
tions from Example 6.2. We show that the twist on z-trivial splitting sets holds
in much greater generality that the twist on splitting sets (although we special-
ize slightly here, by replacing the general function h(z) with a concave quadratic
ztDz).
Example 6.6. Suppose X,Y, Z ⊆ Rn are convex, and let
s(x, y, z) = xTAy + xTBz + yTCz + zTDz + f(x) + g(y),
with D + DT < 0. Then s is twisted on z-trivial splitting sets provided C is
invertible and
B −A(CT )−1(D +DT )
is non-singular.
Proof. Given a z-trivial splitting set Sx at x, we note that if (y, z) ∈ Sx, maxi-
mality of s(x, y, ·) at z (recall Remark 4.6) implies
0 = Dzs(x, y, z) = B
Tx+ CT y + (D +DT )z,
so y = −(CT )−1[BTx + (D + DT )z]. For a given p, we will show that only
one point of the form (y, z) = (−(CT )−1[BTx+ (D +DT )z], z) can satisfy the
condition
p = Dxs(x, y, z) = Ay+Bz+Df(x) = A(−(C
T )−1[BTx+(D+DT )z])+Bz+Df(x).
Indeed, the mapping
z 7→ A(−(CT )−1[BTx+(D+DT )z])+Bz+Df(x) = −A(CT )−1BTx+[B−A(CT )−1(D+DT )]z+Df(x)
is affine and injective by assumption. This completes the proof.
Remark 6.7. In the model above, if A is also invertible, we have
B −A(CT )−1(D +DT ) = A(CT )−1[CTA−1B − (D +DT )].
If in addition, we have CTA−1B+BT (AT )−1C > 0, then the surplus is twisted
on splitting sets, according to Example 6.2. Twist on z-trivial splitting sets is
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much weaker, requiring only invertibility of [CTA−1B − (D +DT )] rather than
positivity of its symmetric part, which is implied by the condition CTA−1B +
BT (AT )−1C > 0 in Example 6.2.
Furthermore, the matrices B and A in this example are not required to have
full rank; in particular, this model incorporates low dimensional buyer seller
interactions, where preferences of buyers/sellers for their partners are dependent
on only some of their characteristics (for instance, if all the entries of A are
0 except the upper left hand corner A11, partners’ preferences depend only on
the first characteristics, x1 and y1). In its general form, the model interpolates
between the strictly hedonic case, where A = 0, and the case with strong, full
dimensional interactions between buyers and seller, when A has full rank.
6.3 A surplus violating twist on z-trivial splitting sets,
and a non pure solution
Here we exhibit an example of a surplus violating the twist on z-trivial splitting
sets condition, and demonstrate explicitly that in this case, matching equilibria
may not be pure.
We let X,Y, Z be intervals in R; the consumers’ and sellers’ surplus are
given respectively by u(x, y, z) = xy + xz and v(x, y, z) = −yz − z2/2, so that
s(x, y, z) = xy + xz − yz − z2/2. It seems reasonable to interpret this surplus
economically as a toy model for the effects of ethical business practices. The
variable x ∈ X will represent the income of a consumer and z ∈ Z the quality
of a good. Firms will be differentiated according to a variable y ∈ Y which we
may think of as reflecting the ethicality of their business practices (as perceived
by consumers); for example, firms with large values of y may provide their
workers with better working conditions. Consumers’ preferences then have two
supermodular terms, reflecting separately their preferences to buy higher quality
goods and to purchase them from more ethical businesses (the supermodularity
of xy may be interpreted as consumers with more disposable income having
stronger preferences for ethically produced goods than their lower income coun-
terparts). Producers’ preferences are independent of consumers, but their costs
yz + z2/2 include a quadratic term in good quality and also a supermodular
term yz, meaning more ethical firms have higher marginal production costs (for
instance, producing a higher quality good may take more hours of labour than
a lower quality good – the resulting difference in cost will be higher for a firm
paying higher wages).
Now note that for U(x) = x
2
2 and V (y) =
y2
2 , we have
s(x, y, z)− U(x)− V (y) = −
|x− y − z|2
2
≤ 0 (8)
with equality when x = y + z. Then taking γ to be uniform measure on the
set X × Y × Z ∩ {x = y + z}, we immediately get that γ is a stable matching
measure for its marginals µ = (PX)#γ and ν = (PY )#γ, with payoff funtions
U and V . This matching is certainly not pure; each consumer x is indifferent
among a continuum of choices of producers y.
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We note that when consumer x and producer y match together, they ex-
change product z = x−y, for price px,y,z = u(x, y, z)−U(x) = x(y+z)−x
2/2 =
x2/2 . A y varies, increasing favourability of the firm y to the consumer x is
exactly offset by the decreasing quality of the good z = x − y they exchange,
and the price remains constant.
Remark 6.8. By example (6.6), the surplus function s(x, y, z) = xy+xz−yz−
az2 is twisted on z-trivial splitting sets for any constant a other than a = 12 ,
indicating that the previous example is highly non generic.
7 Conclusion
This paper studies a general hybrid matching-hedonic model where agents match
according to their preferences for both their partners and the good or contract
they exchange. In contrast to strict matching and strict hedonic problems, these
mixed models do not seem to have received much theoretical attention yet, but
are quite natural in a variety of settings.
The hybrid problem has a natural connection with tripartite matching, or
multi-marginal optimal transport; specifically, every stable matching in the hy-
brid model solves a corresponding optimal transport problem. This observa-
tion, together with known results on multi-marginal optimal transport, can be
exploited to reveal information on the structure of matching patters. In par-
ticular, locally, the dimension of the support of a stable matching measure is
controlled in terms of the mixed second order partial derivatives of the surplus;
this result holds without any conditions on the distributions µ and ν of agents.
In addition, if µ is absolutely continuous, the twist on splitting sets condition
is known to imply purity and uniqueness of stable matchings in multi-marginal
optimal transport and therefore immediately implies the same for the hybrid
problem. It can also be used as a guide to develop a weaker variant, twist
on z-trivial splitting sets, which implies purity and uniqueness in the hedonic-
matching problem but not in the more general tripartite matching problem.
Appendices
Appendix A Proofs
A.1 Proof of variational formulation: Theorem 2.2
The proof requires the following Lemma, expressing a duality result for the
linear maximization (3).
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Lemma A.1.
sup
γ∈ΓXY Z(µ,ν)
∫
X×Y×X
s(x, y, z)dγ(x, y, z) = inf
U,V
∫
X
U(x)dµ(x) +
∫
Y
V (y)dν(y)
(9)
where the infimum on the right hand side is taken over the set of continuous
functions U ∈ C(X) and V ∈ C(Y ) satisfying U(x)+V (y) ≥ s(x, y, z) through-
out X × Y × Z. Furthermore, the infimum on the right hand side is attained.
We will refer to the minimization on the right hand side as the dual problem
to (3). The lemma is a variant of the standard, optimal transport duality
theorem, and it’s proof is a straightforward adaptation of the proof of that
result in [27, Theorem 1.3].
Proof. The Riesz representation theorem implies that the dual of C(X×Y ×Z)
is the set M(X × Y × Z) of signed regular Borel measures on X × Y × Z. We
define the functionals F and G on C(X × Y × Z) by
F (f) =
{
0 if f(x, y, z) ≥ s(x, y, z) for all (x, y, z)
+∞ otherwise
and
G(f) =
{ ∫
X U(x)µ(x) +
∫
Y V (y)dν(y) if f(x, y, z) = U(x) + V (y)
+∞ otherwise.
Fenchel-Rockafellar duality (see, for example, Theorem 1.9 in [27]) then as-
serts that
inf
f∈C(X×Y×Z)
[F (f) +G(f)] = sup
γ∈M(X×Y×Z)
[−F ∗(−γ)−G∗(γ)] (10)
where F ∗ and G∗ are the Legendre-Fenchel transforms of F and G, respectively.
It is easy to check that the infimum above coincides with the infimum in (9).
On the other hand, we compute
F ∗(−γ) := sup
f∈C(X×Y×Z)
[−
∫
X×Y×Z
f(x, y, z)dγ − F (f)]
= sup
f∈C(X×Y×Z), f≥s
−
∫
X×Y×Z
f(x, y, z)dγ
= − inf
f∈C(X×Y×Z), f≥s
∫
X×Y×Z
f(x, y, z)dγ.
Now, if γ is not a positive measure, the infimum above is clearly −∞, while if
it is a positive measure, the infimum is attained at f = s. So we have
F ∗(−γ) =
{
−
∫
X×Y×Z s(x, y, z)dγ(x, y, z) if γ ≥ 0
+∞ otherwise.
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Similarly,
G∗(γ) := sup
f∈C(X×Y×Z)
[
∫
X×Y×Z
f(x, y, z)dγ −G(f)]
= sup
(U,V )∈C(X)×C(Y )
[ ∫
X×Y×Z
[U(x) + V (y)]dγ(x, y, z)−
∫
X
U(x)dµ(x) −
∫
Y
V (y)dν(y)
]
= sup
(U,V )∈C(X)×C(Y )
[ ∫
X
U(x)d(γX − µ)(x) +
∫
Y
V (y)d(γY − ν)(y)
]
,
where γX = (PX)#γ and γY = (PY )#γ are the projections of γ onto X and
Y , respectively. The integrals inside the supremum are clearly 0 for each choice
of U, V if γ has µ and ν as its X and Y marginals, respectively, and so the
supremum is 0 in this case. If the marginals of γ are not µ and ν, then the
supremum is clearly +∞, so we have
G∗(γ) =
{
0 if γ has marginals µ and ν
+∞ otherwise.
Noting that, if γ is a signed measure, γ ∈ ΓXY Z(µ, ν) is equivalent to γ
being non-negative and having µ and ν as it X and Y marginals, it is then
straightforward to see that the supremum in (10) is exactly the supremum in
(9).
To obtain existence in the dual problem, note that for any U, V such that
U(x) + V (y) ≥ s(x, y, z), we have
Us(y) := sup
x,z
s(x, y, z)− U(x) ≤ V (y)
and then
Uss(x) := sup
y,z
s(x, y, z)− Us(y) ≤ U(x).
Now, as s is assumed Lipschitz, Us and Uss are Lipschitz with the same constant
C, by a now classical argument of McCann [15, Lemma 2]. By shifting Us →
Us + a and Uss → Us − a, we may also assume that Us(x¯) = 0 for some fixed
x¯; together with the Lipschitz condition and compactness, this implies that
|Us|, |Uss| ≤ K for some fixed K.
Noting that we have Uss(x) + Us(y) ≥ s(x, y, z), and
∫
X U
ss(x)dµ(x) +∫
Y
Us(y)dν(y) ≤
∫
X
U(x)dµ(x) +
∫
Y
V (y)dν(y), we may take the minimization
in the dual problem over functions which in addition to the constraint U(x) +
V (y) ≥ s(x, y, z) are Lipschitz with uniform constant C and bounded by the
uniform constant K. This set is compact with respect to uniform convergence,
by the Arzela-Ascoli theorem, which implies existence of a minimizer.
The preceding lemma can be used to prove Theorem 2.2; the solutions U
and V to the dual problem turn out to be exactly the payoff functions.
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Proof. Given a stable matching γ¯ on X×Y ×Z, and associated payoff functions
U(x) and V (y), we integrate the inequality (2) against any other matching
γ ∈ ΓXY Z(µ, ν) to obtain∫
X×Y×Z
s(x, y, z)dγ(x, y, z) ≤
∫
X×Y×Z
U(x)+V (y)dγ(x, y, z) =
∫
X
U(x)dµ(x)+
∫
Y
V (y)dν(y).
(11)
On the other hand, the stability of γ¯ means that we have equality in (2) γ¯
almost everywhere, so we have equality in the preceding argument when γ = γ¯.
This means the stable matching γ¯ is optimal in (3).
On the other hand, if γ¯ solves (3), let U and V be solution to the dual
problem, guaranteed to exist by the lemma above. Then, we have s(x, y, z) ≤
U(x) + V (y) everywhere by definition, and so
∫
X×Y×Z
s(x, y, z)dγ¯(x, y, z) ≤
∫
X×Y×Z
U(x)+V (y)dγ¯(x, y, z) =
∫
X
U(x)dµ(x)+
∫
Y
V (y)dν(y).
However, the duality lemma states that we actually have equality,
∫
X×Y×Z
s(x, y, z)dγ¯(x, y, z) =∫
X U(x)dµ(x)+
∫
Y V (y)dν(y), which is possible only if s(x, y, z) = U(x)+V (y),
γ¯ almost everywhere. Thus, U and V are payoffs for γ¯, and so γ¯ is stable.
A.2 Proof the twist on z-trivial splitting sets implies pu-
rity: Theorem 4.9
Proof. Let γ be a stable equilibrium and U, V the corresponding payoff func-
tions. Let S ⊆ X × Y × Z be the set where equality is attained in (2); as
spt(γ) ⊆ S, it suffices to show that for µ almost all x, the set Sx := {(y, z) :
(x, y, z) ∈ S} is a singleton. Note that, as an immediate consequence of the
definition, Sx is a z-trivial splitting set.
We first set V s(x) = sup(y,z)∈Y×Z s(x, y, z) − V (y). It is known that the
fact that s is Lipschitz in x implies that V s is in fact Lipschitz as well [15], and
hence differentiable Lebesgue almost everywhere by Rademacher’s theorem. In
addition, for a fixed x, (2) implies s(x, y, z) − V (y) ≤ U(x) for every choice of
(y, z), and so taking supremum over (y, z) yields
V s(x) ≤ U(x).
Therefore, for all (x, y, z), we have the following string of inequalities
U(x) + V (y) ≥ V s(x) + V (y) ≥ s(x, y, z).
Furthermore, as the first and last terms are equal on S, we must have equality
throughout this set; in particular,
V s(x) + V (y) = s(x, y, z)
on S. Now, for every x at which V s is differentiable, and y, z ∈ Sx, the envelope
theorem implies
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DV s(x) = Dxs(x, y, z). (12)
However, as Sx is a z-trivial splitting set at x, the (TzSS) condition implies
that this uniquely determines y and z. That is, the splitting set Sx is a singleton.
This holds for each x where V s is differentiable, which is Lebesgue almost every
x, and hence µ almost every x, by the absolute continuity of µ. For each such
x, we define (FY (x), FZ (x)) to be the unique (y, z) satisfying (12); γ is then
concentrated on the graph of (FY , FZ), and is therefore pure. This completes
the proof.
A.3 Proof of equivalence between the hybrid matching-
hedonic problem and the reduced matching problem:
Proposition 5.1
Proof. Let γ be a maximizer in (3) and set σ = γXY = (PXY )#γ. Then clearly
σ ∈ ΓXY (µ, ν); we will show that it maximizes (7). For any other σ˜ ∈ ΓXY (µ, ν),
set γ˜ = (Id, Id, z¯)#σ˜ and note that γ˜ ∈ ΓXY Z(µ, ν).
We have
∫
X×Y
s¯(x, y)dσ(x, y) =
∫
X×Y
s(x, y, z¯(x, y))dσ(x, y)
=
∫
X×Y×Z
s(x, y, z¯(x, y))dγ(x, y, z), as σ = (PXY )#γ
≥
∫
X×Y×Z
s(x, y, z)dγ(x, y, z),
≥
∫
X×Y×Z
s(x, y, z)dγ˜(x, y, z), as γ maximizes (3)
=
∫
X×Y
s(x, y, z¯(x, y))dσ˜(x, y) as γ˜ = (Id× Id× s¯)#σ˜
=
∫
X×Y
s¯(x, y)dσ˜(x, y)
As σ˜ ∈ ΓXY (µ, ν) was arbitrary, it follows that σ is optimal in (7).
On the other hand, let σ be any maximizer in (7) and γ = (Id, Id, s¯)#σ. It
is clear that γ ∈ ΓXY Z(µ, ν); we need to show that it maximizes (3). For any
other γ˜ ∈ ΓXY Z(µ, ν), we set σ˜ = (PXY )#γ˜ and observe σ˜ ∈ ΓXY (µ, ν). We
then have, by reasoning similar to the above,
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∫
X×Y×Z
s(x, y, z)dγ(x, y, z) =
∫
X×Y
s(x, y, z¯(x, y))dσ(x, y)
=
∫
X×Y
s¯(x, y)dσ(x, y)
≥
∫
X×Y
s¯(x, y)dσ˜(x, y)
=
∫
X×Y
s(x, y, z¯(x, y))dσ˜(x, y)
=
∫
X×Y×Z
s(x, y, z¯(x, y))dγ˜(x, y, z)
≥
∫
X×Y×Z
s(x, y, z)dγ˜(x, y, z).
This yields optimality of γ in (3) and completes the proof.
A.4 Proof of equivalence between twistedness of s¯ and
twistedness on z-trivial splitting sets of s: Theorem
5.2
Proof. First suppose s is twisted on z trival splitting sets. Fix x, set V (y) =
s¯(x, y) and
Sx = {(y, z) : z ∈ argmax(s(x, y, z))}
Then Sx is a z-trivial splitting set for s at x, with splitting function V , as
for any y, z we have by definition
V (y) = s¯(x, y) ≥ s(x, y, z)
with equality whenever (y, z) ∈ Sx.
Now, choose y0, y1 satisfying
Dxs¯(x, y0) = Dxs¯(x, y1); (13)
we want to show y0 = y1. We can choose z0 ∈ argmaxz(s(x, y0, z)) and z1 ∈
argmaxz(s(x, y1, z)), so that (y0, z0), (y1, z1) ∈ Sx. By the envelope condition,
we have
Dxs¯(x, y0) = Dxs(x, y0, z0)
and
Dxs¯(x, y1) = Dxs(x, y1, z1)
Combined with (13), this implies that Dxs(x, y0, z0) = Dxs(x, y1, z1). As
(y0, z0) and (y1, z1) both belong to the z- trivial splitting set S, the twist on
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z-trivial splitting sets hypothesis now implies (y0, z0) = (y1, z1); in particular,
y0 = y1 as desired.
Conversely, assume s¯ is twisted, and suppose that (y0, z0), (y1, z1) ∈ Sx,
where Sx is a z-trivial splitting set at x, such that
Dxs(x, y0, z0) = Dxs(x, y1, z1); (14)
we need to show (y0, z0) = (y1, z1). Let V be the splitting function for Sx; then
V (y0) ≥ s(x, y0, z)
for all z, with equality for z = z0. As the left hand side is independent of z, this
tells us that z0 ∈ argmaxzs(x, y0, z) and so s¯(x, y0) = s(x, y0, z0). The envelope
theorem then yields
Dxs¯(x, y0) = Dxs(x, y0, z0).
An identical argument implies
Dxs¯(x, y1) = Dxs(x, y1, z1)
and so we have Dxs¯(x, y0) = Dxs¯(x, y1). The twist condition then gives us
y0 = y1 =: y. It remains to verify that z0 = z1. To this end, note that (14) now
becomes
Dxs(x, y, z0) = Dxs(x, y, z1)
and so the x− z twist condition implies z0 = z1, completing the proof.
A.5 Proof that strictly hedonic surpluses are twisted on
z-trivial splitting sets: assertion in Example 6.4
This result actually follows by combining Theorem 5.2 with a result in [20],
which asserts that the reduced surplus s¯ corresponding to a strictly hedonic
surplus s is twisted (under the assumptions in Example 6.4); however, we feel
it is enlightening to provide a direct proof as well.
Proof. Let Sx be a z-trivial splitting set at x, with splitting function V (y).
Assume Dxs(x, y0, z0) = Dxs(x, y1, z1) for (y0, z0), (y1, z1) ∈ Sx; we need to
show (y0, z0) = (y1, z1). Note that the form of s implies
Dxu(x, z0) = Dxs(x, y0, z0) = Dxs(x, y1, z1) = Dxu(x, z1);
the x− z twist condition on u then implies that z0 = z1.
It remains to show y0 = y1. Now, z 7→ u(x, z)+v(y0, z)−V (y0) is maximized
at z = z0, and so its derivative vanishes there (note z ∈ Z
0 by assumption):
Dzu(x, z0) +Dzv(y0, z0) = 0
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or
Dzu(x, z0) = −Dzv(y0, z0)
Similarly,
Dzu(x, z1) = −Dzv(y1, z1),
which, as z0 = z1, combines with the above to yield Dzv(y0, z0) = Dzv(y1, z0).
The z − y twistedness of v then yields y0 = y1, which completes the proof.
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